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Abstract
In spite of the hostile external environment, Jordan has 
displayed resilience in maintaining internal cohesion in the 
face of adversity.  The combination of the global financial 
crisis, energy crisis, closure of trade routes resulting to 
a de facto economic siege, Arab spring regional turmoil, 
increasing the cost of security, decreases in remittance 
and the rising oil and food prices have placed substantial 
pressure on the Jordanian economy and fiscal effort. 
As a result of the economic crises, Jordan encountered 
profound macro-economic and structural related issues as 
well as a severe balance of payments crisis.
In the past three decades, Jordan has adopted various 
reform programs in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in hopes of stabilizing its economy 
through neo-liberal policies (El-Said, Harrigan, 2009). 
This paper aims to determine the extent to which IMF 
programs contributed to Jordan’s economic prosperity in 
tackling challenges in its macro-economy from 1989 to 
2019. The IMF reform programs were supported under 
several stand-by agreements (SBA’S) and Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) arrangements.  This paper would discuss 
what the overall objectives of the reform programs were 
and whether they were relevant to Jordan’s circumstances. 
Whether the IMF policies and processes worked in favour 
of Jordan’s institutional dealings and if Jordan received 
preference from the IMF concerning their geopolitical 
considerations. 
Key words: IMF; Jordan economy; 1980 crisis; 
World bank; Post Economic Crisis
Alkha t ib ,  W. ,  &  Mohamed ,  N .  (2019) .  30  Yea r s  on ,  Has 
t h e  I M F  H e l p e d  o r  H i n d e r e d  t h e  J o r d a n i a n  E c o n o m y ? . 
Canad ian  Soc ia l  Sc i ence,  15 (7 ) ,  15 -21 .  Ava i l ab l e  f rom: 
h t tp : / /www.cscanada .ne t / index.php/css /ar t ic le /v iew/11218 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/11218
INTRODUCTION
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small, resource-
poor middle economy country with a population of 
60million.  It is strategically located in the centre of the 
Arab world, sharing borders with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
West Bank and Israel (Ahid & Augustine, 2012). Jordan’s 
economy is characterized by its strong dependence on 
both global and regional aid; it is a labour exporting, oil-
importing economy that has a limited industrial base 
(Pfeifer, 1999).  The fate of Jordan is greatly influenced 
by political events in the region and the fluctuating 
oil market. Jordan’s economy over the past charted 
expansionist fiscal policies or “bad habits” such as lavish 
subsidies for food and other primary commodities and 
creation of jobs in the over stamped public sector (El-Said, 
Harrigan & Wang 2014).
In spite of the hostile external environment, Jordan has 
displayed resilience in maintaining internal cohesion in the 
face of adversity.  The combination of the global financial 
crisis, energy crisis, closure of trade routes resulting to 
a de facto economic siege, Arab spring regional turmoil, 
increasing the cost of security, decreases in remittance 
and the rising oil and food prices have placed substantial 
pressure on the Jordanian economy and fiscal effort. 
As a result of the economic crises, Jordan encountered 
profound macro-economic and structural related issues as 
well as a severe balance of payments crisis.
In the past three decades, Jordan has adopted various 
reform programs in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in hopes of stabilizing its economy 
through neo-liberal policies (El-Said, Harrigan, 2009). 
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This paper aims to determine the extent to which IMF 
programs contributed to Jordan’s economic prosperity in 
tackling challenges in its macro-economy from 1989 to 
2019. The IMF reform programs were supported under 
several stand-by agreements (SBA’S) and Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) arrangements.  This paper would discuss 
what the overall objectives of the reform programs were 
and whether they were relevant to Jordan’s circumstances. 
Whether the IMF policies and processes worked in favour 
of Jordan’s institutional dealings and if Jordan received 
preference from the IMF concerning their geopolitical 
considerations. 
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE 1970’S 
AND EARLY 1980’S
To comprehend the fundamental economic issues facing 
Jordan, it is essential to discuss the period after the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War due to its enduring repercussions on the 
economy (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang, 2006). During this 
period, Palestinian refugees who were at the time residing 
in Jordan considered work in the surrounding Gulf states 
due to the lack of opportunities in Jordan, and this led 
to the first wave of exporting skilled workers to Oil-rich 
Arab countries (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014).  In the 1980s 
almost one-third of the labour force was employed in the 
gulf leading to an increase in the inflow of remittance, 
which increased the private consumption to 8.8 % (1970-
1980).  
Fol lowing the war,  the  United States  (U.S.) 
government coerced the Jordanian government to enter 
a peace treaty with Israel. This placed the late King 
Hussein at the time in an awkward position as half of 
his population were of Palestinian origin and directly or 
indirectly supported the PLO. The Palestinian community 
in Jordan also dominated the private sector, severing ties 
with the Palestinians would create uncertainty in both 
political and economic future of Jordan (El-Said, Harrigan 
& Wang, 2006). Therefore, a peace treaty with Israel 
would have been synonymous with political jeopardy. This 
motivated the U.S. suspending all aid revenue to Jordan 
as a consequence of King Hussein’s political stance. 
Hence, it led to the reluctance of both the IMF and World 
Bank to enter Jordan. However, after the war ended, 
Jordan received financial aid from both the international 
community and regional states due to the political and 
economic conditions (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014). The 
wealth of the Oil-rich Arab states also contributed high 
levels of aid to Jordan, which compensated for the 
absence of American assistance. Simultaneously the 
demand for Jordanian industrial and agricultural exports 
in the region increased, more than half of Jordanian 
exports and imports were with the Arab countries. Jordan 
also imported its Oil from the region, which was its 
highest imported commodity, during the 1970’s-1980’ s it 
solely came from Iraq at a highly subsidized price (El-Said, 
Harrigan & Wang, 2006).
Additionally, Jordan, in the 1970s, strengthened its 
import substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) that 
commenced in the 1950s (Imai, 2012). The government 
introduced a range of protective measures comprising 
of financial incentives and high tariffs and non-tariff 
obstacles that were implemented to protect the domestic 
market from foreign competition to prompt domestic 
production (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 2014). These 
protection methods were put in place temporarily in hopes 
to encourage new industries to mature adequately to face 
foreign competitors. 
Despite the government’s actions to increase its trade 
revenue, Jordan heavily relied on a massive inflow of 
external aid and remittances to manage its economy 
and meet the targeted growth rates.  As a result of the 
inflow of aid and remittances during this period, Jordan 
generated strong economic outputs (El-Said, Harrigan & 
Wang 2014). The government was able to invest in both 
physical and human infrastructure; public spending also 
increased in the 1970s from 35.3% to 47% in the 1980s. 
As an outcome of the positive economic outputs, Jordan’s 
economy performed strongly with an annual GDP 
increase of 11.6% and the unemployment rate reaching 
a low of 4.8% in 1982 (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). Jordan 
also observed improvements in areas such as an increase 
in literacy levels and access to education, a decrease 
in infant mortality rates, increase in life expectancy 
and advancements in physical infrastructure (El-Said, 
Harrigan, 2009).
While Jordan witnessed strong economic growth 
during this period, it is essential to consider specific 
characteristics that illustrated the Jordanian economy. 
First, despite the massive inflow of aid, the Jordanian 
government experienced large budget deficits, without 
aid the GDP ratio to the budget deficit would be 
28.6% however, with the help of aid this budget deficit 
decreased to 10.8% (Jordan Strategy Reform, 2017). 
Second, the economy was also experiencing a growing 
trade discrepancy that surpassed the 50% GDP mark 
in 1980. The dependency on aid and remittances had 
clear negative implications such as trade and budget 
deficits (Jordan Strategy Reform, 2017). This made the 
Jordanian economy reliant on external outputs in which 
policymakers had little to no control off.  This was the 
first of many external income shocks that soon pursued 
to control the growth dynamics of the country (El-Said, 
Harrigan & Wang 2014). 
THE 1989 CRISIS
The 1980’s collapse of the oil market significantly 
impacted regional economies as the sharp decrease in 
oil prices led to an economic slowdown. Jordan, as an 
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oil-importing state to some degree, benefitted from 
the decrease in oil prices; however, confronted more 
significant challenges such as the decrease in remittances, 
investment and tourism revenue (El-Said, Harrigan & 
Wang 2014). Also, aid to GDP ratio decreased from 16.3% 
to 12.5% as Arab aid in the region was directed towards 
Iraq during the Iraq/Iran war. The decrease in oil prices 
also harmed the trade sector as the demand for Jordanian 
labour and products in the region weakened, and this led 
to a rise in unemployment in Jordan as many expatriates 
returned home (El-Said, Harrigan, 2009). 
Additionally, despite the challenges of the external 
environment, the role of the Jordanian government 
further exacerbated the economic situation in the country. 
The government reinforced the protection of the local 
economy and avoided austerity measures advised by local 
economists (Jordan Reform Strategy, 2017). From the 
period of 1983 till 1988 the government implemented a 
range of expansionary policies centred on running down 
reserves and external borrowing. This led to the decline of 
reserves of the central bank in 1989 to a low of $68million, 
which resulted in a significant increase in budget deficits. 
In 1989, the public debt reached a high of 9.5billion 
US, and the government was unable to fulfil its foreign 
debt commitments (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 2014). 
Although Jordan entered into formal agreements with the 
Washington based financial institutions in 1989, both the 
IMF and World Bank played a dominant role in pushing 
for the liberalization of the Jordanian economy during the 
mid-1980s. The government decided to move to a floating 
currency amid both political and economic instability 
despite the warnings that the circumstances at the time 
would lead to a financial crisis (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 
2014). 
During this period, there was also the increasing 
tension between the late King Hussein of Jordan and 
Arafat of the PLO; they failed to reach a consensus on 
who would represent Palestine during peace negotiations 
with Israel. As a consequence, King Hussein resorted 
to an approach where he held secret corporations with 
the Israeli state (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014). This rifted 
ties with the Palestinian community residing in Jordan 
which predominately dominated the private sector as the 
negotiations with Israel and ties with Westbank created 
insecurity in their economic and political future in Jordan. 
Therefore, the Palestinian community immersed in taking 
their capital elsewhere and reduced their investment 
activities in the country, which further contributed to the 
declining economic situation.  The following six months 
the Jordanian dinar lost 50% of its value, and the countries 
per capita income was halved; as a result, the Jordanian 
government was forced to resort to IMF and World Bank 
to fund public spending and reschedule foreign debt. 
Subsequently, the living standards declined rapidly, and 
the social impact of the economic downfall was severe 
(El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 2014). The government’s 
commitment to equity and poverty reduction over the past 
decades were immediately reversed. Within a year the 
living standards of Jordanians almost halved following 
the fall of the dinar value, high inflation rates and slow 
economic growth (Alam, Inchauste & Serajuddin 2017). 
IMF PROGRAM 1989-2004
In 1989 Jordan entered into the first formal agreement 
with the IMF and was granted 60million SDR in Standby 
agreements (Pfeifer, 1999). We can argue that the IMF’s 
involvement in Jordan was not only an outcome of 
Jordan’s dire economic situation but also its political 
circumstances including its negotiations with Israel and 
the West Bank and its attempts to liberalize the economy 
which was greatly influenced by Washington (El-Said, 
Harrigan & Wang, 2006). The reform programs initiated 
by the IMF was funded through three Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) and two Stand- By agreements between 
the periods of 1989 and 2004 (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). 
The programs aimed to focus on stabilizing Jordan’s 
macroeconomy and amending structural challenges facing 
the general budget, which was a significant contributor to 
the economic crisis of 1989. The IMF was to also improve 
Jordan’s increasing external debt, the retreating foreign 
exchange reserves at the Central Bank and the increasing 
deficit in the general budget. 
The stabilization programs introduced by the IMF 
started with a period of austerity measures, which included 
freezing public sector wages, salaries and employment, 
reduction of public expenditure, increases in taxes and 
cutbacks in subsidies (Yom, 2015). As speculated, this led 
to the rise in poverty and social instability. Riots started 
across the nation predominantly in the southern cities 
in which there was a higher population of the poor, as a 
response to the government’s reform policies which were 
worsening already devasting living situations (Alam, 
Inchauste & Serajuddin 2017). 
When measuring the three performance indicators set 
by the IMF during the period 1989-2004, we observed 
that Jordan failed to meet all three set measures. First, 
Jordan did not meet the targeted economic outputs (Assaf 
& Shteiwi, 2018). Second, inflations rates were lower 
than expected although government expenditure was 
increasing, and the Dinar was pegged to the U.S. dollar as 
part of the reform measures (Zeitun & Benjelloun, 2012). 
Thirdly, the fiscal deficit notably decreased in the early 
‘90s due to severe reductions in government expenditure; 
however, total government expenditure did not decrease 
rigorously (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). The only positive 
reform to emerge from the general budget reforms was 
the establishment of the Open Food Assistance program 
which was aimed at assisting those most in need and 
which was later discontinued.  
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During the Gulf-War in 1991-1992 Jordan refrained 
from supporting the U.S. and its allies during the coalition 
against Sadam Hussein and remained disengaged from 
the regional conflict irrespective of its strong opposition 
against foreign intervention (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang, 
2006). As a consequence, all aid flows to Jordan from the 
U.S. and its Gulf allies were immediately discontinued, 
including the suspension of the IMF agreement with less 
than half of the finance been disbursed (El-Said, Harrigan 
& Wang, 2006).  Correspondingly, the government 
restored price controls and capital market, refrained from 
price increases of food items and instead increased food 
and petrol subsidies. It was only the end of 1992 when 
King Hussein expressed his alignment with the U.S. and 
its allies against Sadam the IMF reinstated the agreement 
and aid revenue was reimbursed.  The period following 
Jordan’s alliance with the Coalition Jordan had become 
one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the region and 
the IMF lending facilities.  This is a clear example of how 
Jordan’s foreign policy was severely influenced by the 
U.S. as long as IMF and W.B. were providing financial 
assistance. 
The SBA agreements were renewed for a period of 
12 months, and 4.4 million was allocated. However, the 
government only witnessed real growth in the year 1992, 
and this was not due to the reform measures set by the 
IMF, but rather external factors such as the returning 
expatriates during the Gulf War (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). 
This led to more investment in the country and as an 
outcome, an increase in export revenue. Also, during the 
Gulf War, Jordan experienced a large influx of Iraqi’s 
migrating to Jordan, which positively contributed to the 
economy as it witnessed increases in investments and 
production rates. 
Following the renewal of the IMF agreement in 1992, 
Jordan focussed its resources in meeting the conditions set 
out by the IMF to liberalize its economy successfully, and 
it did this through strategically reforming its public sector 
by introducing a civil service program. The purpose of the 
plan was to cease public sector salaries, wages and all-new 
recruitment initiatives (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). Various 
processes were conducted to rationalize and reform the 
trade sector, including the removal of price controls and 
bans on imports, reducing the limitations on import and 
reducing the tariff rate. Additionally, in 1994, a General 
Sales Tax (GST) was introduced, and it covered a broad 
range of services at a 10% rate. Furthermore, in 1995, the 
Dinar was pegged to the U.S. dollar and currency was 
convertible, and this led to the capital market successfully 
liberalizing by the end of 1996 (Pfeifer, 1999).
Succeeding the end of the IMF and Jordan agreement, 
the government continued with the majority of the 
structural reforms enforced by the IMF. However, the 
government recommenced food and petrol subsidies that 
were halted during the stabilization period and introduced 
income taxes that compensated for the expenses of the 
new subsidies (Alam, Inchauste & Serajuddin 2017). 
The country during this period witnessed positive 
developments in its micro-economy due to two factors; 
first the pegging of the US dollar reinstated trust in 
the Jordanian dinar, second, the demand for Jordanian 
services and products increased across the world (Jordan 
Reform Strategy, 2017).
POST ECONOMIC CRISIS
In 2011 the Jordanian economy was exposed to several 
external shocks after the global financial crisis.  The 
severe impact of the financial crisis reflects Jordan’s 
dependency on food and petrol imports that make it 
highly susceptible to fluctuations in regional economies 
(El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 2014). The fall in oil prices 
in the region led to an economic slowdown that in turn, 
affected tourism and expatiates revenue. Though the 
Jordanian banking sector was not affected by the crisis 
as it was relatively isolated from the global market due 
to structural changes implemented by the government 
(Alam, Inchauste & Serajuddin, 2017). The crisis could be 
described as a chain effect where the economic slowdown 
in the region influenced consumer behaviour in Jordan, 
as the decline in remittances and increase in oil prices 
impacted the purchasing power of Jordanians which as 
a result led to an increase in unemployment and poverty 
rates (Ahid & Augustine, 2012). The 2008 crisis also 
hindered the natural gas supply from Egypt following 
attacks in the Sinai region; the government increased the 
import of fuel to generate electricity to recompensate for 
the gas supply (Ahid & Augustine, 2012).
Subsequently, the Syrian war in 2011 had a substantial 
impact on the Jordanian economy as the large influx of 
Syrian refugees drained state resources such as health 
and education. Also, the increase in refugees led to a 
rise in inflation rates as the higher demand for food and 
services led to an increase in food prices and as a result, 
increase in food importation (Alshoubaki & Harris, 2018). 
Before the 2011 Syrian crisis, the government was aiming 
to reduce food importation to control the increasing 
food prices, but after the massive influx of refugees the 
government was unable to do so, and subsidies decreased 
(Alshoubaki & Harris, 2018). The war was also a burden 
on the trade sector as the transit routes to send good and 
services to Lebanon and Turkey were disrupted. This 
trade route generated 30% of imports and 11% of exports, 
disturbances of this trade route demanded Jordanian 
exporters find new trade routes (Alshoubaki & Harris, 
2018).
As a consequence of the deteriorating economic 
situation in Jordan, the government pursued the IMF 
for a standby credit facility agreement to sustain fiscal 
and external stability (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). The aim 
of the SCF during the period between 2012-2015 was 
to first stabilise the macro-economy by carrying out a 
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range of monetary and structural policies to reduce the 
external imbalances in regional markets (Assaf & Shteiwi, 
2018). This was conducted by restoring state institutions 
such as the National Electric Power (NEPCO) to the 
state to ensure they gain recovery.  Second, construct 
fair government policies that offer better outcomes and 
opportunities for those most vulnerable rather than those 
of high income. Third, promote economic prosperity 
in the medium term by pursuing structural reforms to 
improve the investment climate (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018).
To sustain the macroeconomy during this period, 
the government reinstated the IMF fiscal policies and 
introduced cash transfers to eliminate or reduce subsidies 
due to raising the living cost (Yom, 2015). As an outcome 
of the elimination of subsidies, the government offered 
cash transfers for Jordanian families whose annual 
income did not exceed 12,000 JD and did not possess any 
real estate or two cars (Cobham & Dibeh, 2010).  The 
government also initiated reforms in the pension and 
taxation systems, and as a result of these fiscal policies the 
government was able to partly achieve fiscal sustainability 
as the external and total debt ratios have decreased 
significantly (Zeitun & Benjelloun, 2012).
Although there was slight economic progress in 
restoring the external stability, the country failed to meet 
the targeted economic growth rates set by the IMF. During 
this period, Jordan’s actual growth rate ranged between 
2.5 % and 3.5 % however; the expected growth rate was 
set between 3% - 4.5%. (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). Also, 
Jordan’s economy did not meet the targeted inflation rates, 
IMF expected decreases in inflation rated due to the rise 
in fuel prices in the year 2012-2013 however the inflation 
rate began to decrease only in the year 2014 (Assaf & 
Shteiwi, 2018). Furthermore, despite the total and external 
debt ratios reducing significantly, the economy did not 
reach the expected debt-to-GDP ratio anticipated by 
the IMF in the period ending 2015. This highlights that 
although IMF supported programs contribute to positive 
changes in the overall economy, specific outcomes set by 
the IMF are not attainable (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018).
IMF PROGRAMS 2016-2019
In June 2016 Jordan and the IMF entered into another 
Extended Fund Facility agreement to address the 
existing economic challenges such as the countries 
fiscal imbalance and debt levels (Economic Policy 
Council, 2018). The aim of the agreement was to ensure 
Jordan executes several structural reforms in its macro-
economy growth stimulation to raise 653 million USD 
in state revenue to stabilise the economy and enhance its 
competitiveness nature (Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 
2019). As discussed earlier the GDP grew at a 2.5 – 2% 
rate during 2011-2015 in comparison to the 2002-2010 
average of 6.5%, which is the ideal growth rate for the 
economy to meet its market needs.  The EFF objectives 
for 2016 was not significantly different from those of 
previous years. There were various structural procedures 
set out by the EFF during the period of 2016-2019 to 
reduce the deficit through both monetary and fiscal 
policies.  In terms of economic growth, the set measures 
of the EFF were described to be more realistic and more 
achievable in comparison to previous arrangements, as 
the target growth rate for 2016 was 2.8% and the highest 
would be 4%. Furthermore, the tax reforms for this 
period included introducing a new income tax that would 
increase total tax revenue and stabilise public debt to 94% 
by the end of 2016 (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018).
Reiteratively the government failed to achieve these 
measures as the debt reached 95.1% in 2016 and in 
2018 it reached a high of 28%, and NEPCO was still 
recording losses. As anticipated increasing fees and 
energy prices during a period of weak economic growth 
would further decrease growth rate, and this resulted 
to cutbacks in government’s revenue as individuals 
reduced their investment, consumption and production 
activities. The government predicted revenue following 
softening of EU policies for Jordanian exports that later 
failed considerably, investment prospects that came 
along with the signing of the Cooperation agreement 
with Saudi Arabia that was never really initiated and 
the reopening of trade routes with Iraq which did not 
accumulate much revenue (Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & 
Mansur, 2019). Contrarily, the Jordanian government 
put into consideration the existing Syrian conflict and its 
repercussions on Jordanian institutions, the decline of 
trade, tourism revenue as a result of the instability in the 
region.
WHAT WERE THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMF 
PROGRAMS IN JORDAN?
Although the IMF programs are highly criticized by 
academic’s, the public, professionals and political 
parties over the last 15 years Jordan has observed slight 
economic progress during the period of IMF involvement 
in restoring external viability, attaining macro-economic 
stability and transforming the economic structure (Assaf 
& Shteiwi, 2018). Additionally, public debt has decreased, 
while fiscal stability has been partially achieved.  The 
IMF considers the replacement of food subsidies with 
cash transfers, the introduction of comprehensive income 
and consumption taxation and amendments in the pension 
system as areas of success (Assaf & Shteiwi, 2018). 
However, such reforms fail to acknowledge the social 
impact they endure on society and undermine social 
provisions; thus, by diminishing social welfare provisions, 
the IMF underestimated the most imperative forms of 
authority (Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). 
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Jordan’s prolonged efforts in achieving economic 
success are often described as an IMF victory in the 
region or the “good pupils of the IMF” (Pfeifer, 1999). 
Contrariwise, Jordan’s deep reliance on foreign aid 
resulted to blindly following IMF reform programs 
without any well-defined exit plans entailing how the 
country will convert these programs to coincide with their 
country’s needs. Following the end of IMF agreement, the 
government’s means of creating economic policies were 
greatly influenced by the IMF’s former approaches rather 
than trying to establish policies that target its economic 
culture and mirrors the country’s capacity and natural 
progression (Weaver, 2010). This is a clear example 
of how foreign aid contributes to the dysfunctionality 
of developing states as aid makes poor governments 
underperform.
Additionally, the governments lack of transparency 
when dealing with IMF programs is one of the biggest 
concerns of the public. The public is not engaged during 
the negotiating and designing of these programs (Al-
Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). There are no national 
dialogues or information transmission mechanisms put 
in place to engage the wider public. Hence, the IMF 
programs are established by IMF staff in reference to 
the country’s national development plans with minimal 
participation from the Minister of Finance, who instead 
focuses his efforts in controlling what was implemented 
(Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). 
Furthermore, the IMF policies focused significantly 
on increasing government revenue through the removal 
of subsidies and higher tax in the conquest of economic 
growth. The reform programs failed to comprehend how 
the population would adapt to these changes or how the 
private sector would cope with tax burdens in an already 
harsh economy (Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). 
The recent unemployment survey published in 2017 
indicated that the unemployment rate was at 18.5% and 
was reaching a total of 36.4% for young people between 
20-24, and 22.8% for degree holders. This showed that 
the reform programs failed to address the economic and 
social issues facing the younger population (Al-Katib, 
Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). The IMF policies should 
have considered the future outlook for its policies during 
the initial stages of its involvement to help the Jordanian 
government implement the required institutions and 
policies changes to attain significant expenditure reforms. 
It is also essential to discuss the political implication 
of IMF reform programs in Jordan, as discussed earlier in 
this paper, aid flow to Jordan has been subjective to the 
country’s political position in regional politics (Al-Katib, 
Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 2019). There are extensive study 
and theoretical literature that explains the detriments 
of aid and the perception that aid allocation is broadly 
influenced by donor interest. Jordan is no exception to this 
analogy; many public and political figures discuss how 
the IMF reform programs coerce Jordan to comply with 
political concessions which are funded mostly by the Gulf 
countries and the U.S. (Al-Katib, Abu Anzeh & Mansur, 
2019). This indicates that economic necessity is not the 
only factor that influences the scheduling of IMF loans 
and shift in foreign policy viewpoint such as the signing 
of the peace settlements with Israel is a good forecast. 
Hence, Jordan’s geopolitical positioning in the region 
received preference from the IMF, despite Jordan not 
meeting the IMF’s desired reform objectives as discussed 
above, this was tolerated by the IMF so it can maintain 
a strong foot in the region (El-Said, Harrigan & Wang 
2014). 
CONCLUSION:
To conclude Jordan may have achieved partial economic 
stability with the help of IMF in the last three decades, 
however the country still heavily relies on its neighbouring 
allies and Washington in solving its economic woes. 
Following 15 years of IMF involvement in Jordan the 
country still faces both fiscal and monetary volatility such 
as high debt and lower per capita GDP. The Jordanian 
governments lack of good governance in regard to 
economic issues such as low productivity, institutionalism, 
public debt and deficit still prevail to exist. The absence 
of strategic economic policy that would lead the decision-
making process and focuses on the long-term vision rather 
than short-term plans is the reason why the country is 
failing to achieve desirable growth outcomes. If Jordan 
were to pursue a further IMF agreement it needs to 
renegotiate the agreement terms to ensure it meets the 
needs of its economy as the current IMF policies have 
led to lower incomes, unemployment, increase in crime 
and wider poverty. Furthermore, the IMF would need to 
put into consideration the internal and external issues that 
negatively affect the Jordanian economy before trying to 
annex Jordan to the global economy as this tremendously 
weakens the economy and exacerbates existing crises. 
Furthermore, IMF austerity programs would need to stress 
on social welfare as they bear significant implications 
such as deteriorating government-population relationships. 
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